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Kierkegaard, Løgstrup and the conditions of love: from God’s grace to life as a gift 
 
 
Abstract: In this paper, I consider how pride and anxiety can prevent us from loving the 
neighbour, and how Søren Kierkegaard and K. E. Løgstrup offer two different ways in which 
these obstacles might be overcome. For Kierkegaard, this is made possible if we stand in the 
right relation to God, while for Løgstrup it is made possible if we understand life as a gift. 
The differences and respective merits of both approaches are explored, and in particular 
whether Løgstrup’s approach can claim to offer a secular alternative to the role that 
Kierkegaard gives to God’s grace in making neighbour love possible. 
 
‘Love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real’ – 
Iris Murdoch1 
 
Let me start with an example.  
Suppose I see someone begging on the street, who catches my eye, and I give him 
some of my loose change. In doing so, I take it, I have done a good thing, in helping a fellow 
human being. But have I loved my neighbour? 
In one sense, the answer might seem obviously to be: yes. For, I have done 
something for a stranger, not a family member or friend, and I have done so not expecting 
anything in return, just to help him out. 
But still, the question can be asked: have I loved my neighbour? On further 
reflection, the answer may well be: probably not. For it is highly likely – indeed virtually 
certain – that in giving the man my money, I have done so with a feeling of slight 
condescension, or pity, or even contempt. For, I might well be thinking: Isn’t it rather 
pathetic that he is in this situation? Isn’t his uncleanliness rather repellent? Doesn’t the fact 
that he depends on me make him rather weak? And so on. 
Of course, I have still given him my money, so I have done my duty by him, as it were 
– but still, doing my duty here does not seem to be the same as showing him love. For, in 
loving another, it would appear, there can be no pride, no sense of superiority, no sense 
                                                        
1 Iris Murdoch, ‘The Sublime and the Good’, Existentialism and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature, 
edited by Peter Conradi (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1997), pp. 205–20, p. 215. 
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that I stand above the one who is loved. Any such pride is an acid that destroys love, not 
only in the case of natural love (such as love of partners, family, and friends), but also in the 
case of neighbour love – this just seems to be a fundamental part of the phenomenology of 
love, which cannot tolerate the sense of hierarchy that comes from pride. Given this 
phenomenology, it seems highly unlikely that I have succeeded in loving my neighbour here. 
If this is right, the question then arises: How is such pride to be taken away, in order 
that love of the neighbour can be achieved? How is love of the neighbour possible, if pride 
of this sort stands in the way, as one important blockage to that love?2 An obvious answer 
to that question is: by replacing pride with humility.3 If I felt some humility regarding my 
differences from the beggar – the fact that I have money and he doesn’t, that I am well 
dressed and he isn’t, that I am in a position to spare my change to give it to him, and he 
can’t do the same for me – by feeling that none of this made me superior to him in any way, 
as really we are not that different after all, then this could undercut my pride, and put us on 
a par.4 
But then, of course, a further question arises in its turn: How is this humility itself to 
be achieved? What has to change in my outlook to make this humility possible? 
In this paper, I wish to consider two answers to this question, both of which stand in 
the broadly Lutheran tradition, but which are different in other respects – where one 
fundamentally incorporates the role of grace, and is clearly theological, and the other does 
not, and so is not. The first answer I will consider is given by Søren Kierkegaard, and the 
second by K. E. Løgstrup. Having explored the differences between them in the first section, 
in the second section I will then consider whether Løgstrup’s account offers a workable 
secular alternative to Kierkegaard’s. 
 
1. Kierkegaard on grace, Løgstrup on life as a gift 
In a well-known journal entry from 1851, Kierkegaard writes: 
                                                        
2 I am not here claiming it is the only important blockage – another one will be brought into the discussion 
below in §2, namely anxiety. 
3 It could be asked whether modesty might be an alternative to humility here. This cannot be discussed 
further, but I am taking them to be broadly equivalent notions in this context. 
4 If humility is understood to mean having a just estimate of one’s standing, then it could be argued that it 
could still leave me feeling superior, as in the case of Aristotle’s megalopsychos: more will be said below about 
why the grounds of humility here will not have that result, so that humility will also involve equality. 
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Christianly the emphasis does not fall so much upon to what extent or how far a 
person succeeds in meeting or fulfilling the requirement, if he actually is striving, as 
it is upon getting an impression of the requirement in all its infinitude so that he 
rightly learns to be humbled and to rely upon grace… infinite humiliation and grace, 
and then a striving born of gratitude – this is Christianity.5  
While Kierkegaard expresses elsewhere his reservations about the way in which Luther has 
been used (or misused) within contemporary Christendom,6 the fundamental Lutheranism 
of his position here is clear and evident. For Luther, one of the central objections to 
‘justification through works’ is that it fuels the pride in our achievement and in our 
righteousness, thereby setting us above our neighbour and even above God, who is then 
expected to award us appropriately.7 This structure must therefore be reversed: we should 
feel condemned by the law, which strikes down this pride. At the same time, however, 
being convicted in this way does not leave us anxious about our salvation, an anxiety which 
would also cut us off from the neighbour and from God; instead, God is not a hard-hearted 
judge but a gracious source of unearned forgiveness, a forgiveness that frees us from 
ourselves in such a way as to the overcome our in-turning pride and our anxiety, which then 
makes possible love of both God and of the neighbour as its fruit.8 On this account, then, 
properly understood, the Lutheran position is not indifferent to works of love: on the 
contrary, it is designed to show how the ‘infinite humiliation and grace’ that comes with a 
Lutheran ‘theology of the cross’ frees us from the kind of pride and anxiety that makes such 
works impossible by basing our justification upon these works. 
                                                        
5 Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, 7 vols (ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna 
H. Hong, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967–78), 1, no. 993, pp. 443–4. 
6 For a thorough discussion of Kierkegaard’s relation to Luther, see David Lawrence Coe, Kierkegaard and 
Luther (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2020).  
7 See for example Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, in Luther’s Works, American edition, 55 vols (St Louis 
and Philadelphia: Concordia and Fortress Press, 1958–86), 33, pp. 61–2: ‘First, God has assuredly promised his 
grace to the humble, that is, to those who lament and despair of themselves. But no man can be thoroughly 
humbled until he knows that his salvation is utterly beyond his own powers, devices, endeavours, will, and 
works, and depends entirely on the choice, will, and work of another, namely of God alone’. 
8 Cf. Martin Luther, Sommerpostille, D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 67 vols in 127 
(Weimar: Hermann Böhlau, 1883–1993), 22, p. 15: ‘Anyone who does not believe but goes on doubting the 
grace and love of God will not have the heart to express his love and thanks to God by responding to his 
neighbour in love. However, this faith which recognizes the great grace and goodness of God which helped 
him from death to life, always inflames a man’s heart to love and to good, even to his enemies, just as God has 
done for him.’ 
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 It is clear, then, that Kierkegaard follows Luther in taking the so-called ‘convicting 
use of the law’ to be fundamental in dismantling the pride which is our focus here, where 
the humbling is two-fold. First, in the face of God and the good he represents, and what he 
requires of us, we are all sinners, me alongside everyone else. Seen from a certain human 
perspective, as it were, this may not be immediately obvious – from this level, I may appear 
to be doing better than others in various ways. But once I think of comparing myself to the 
goodness of God and of Christ, these differences vanish to insignificance, while in seeing 
how far I can therefore be justifiably condemned, I lose all authority to condemn others and 
set myself above them9 – in this way, as Hegel argues in the Phenomenology, the ‘hard 
heart’ must break.10 Second, we are also humbled by God’s generosity and love in setting all 
this aside, and forgiving us, as this means we owe a debt of gratitude to God that we can 
never repay, a sense of indebtedness that again should take away our pride.11 
 On Kierkegaard’s account of the overcoming of pride, therefore, grace plays a central 
role, as on the one side it is the complement to the convicting use of the law which humbles 
us in one way through the ‘impression of the requirement in all its infinitude’, and on the 
other side it is the source of our indebtedness that humbles us in another way. Taken 
together, this is the explanation of how we might be enabled to form a relation to the 
neighbour without pride getting between us, and thus be enabled to truly love them in the 
way that in my relation to the beggar, I could not. 
 Turning now to Løgstrup, it is clear that he approaches many of these issues in the 
same way as Kierkegaard, in a broadly Lutheran manner. Thus, he stresses that we are not 
made good through our own efforts, for which we can claim some kind of reward that can 
be used to offset our wickedness.12 Moreover, while he does not speak of pride and humility 
                                                        
9 Cf. Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, I, no. 334, p. 140: ‘[Christ] comes to save us and to present the 
example. This very example should humble us, teach us how infinitely far away we are from attaining the 
ideal’. 
10 See G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (trans. Terry Pinkard; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2018), p. 387. For further discussion, see Robert Stern, ‘Is Hegelian Recognition Second-Personal? Hegel 
Says “No”’, European Journal of Philosophy, online publication 2021, §2. 
11 Cf. Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love (trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong; Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), p. 190: ‘[The individual] remains in the debt [to God], and he also acknowledges that it 
is his duty to remain in the debt, his duty to make this confession, which in the Christian sense is not the 
confession of a fanatic but of a humble, loving soul.’ For further discussion of these Lutheran themes in Works 
of Love, see Amy Laura Hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), Chapter 1. 
12 ‘When speaking of the notion that there is “at least some” good in human beings, one means to subtract 
something from wickedness and then add it to goodness—on the individual’s own account! As if trust and 
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as explicitly as Luther and Kierkegaard,13 he does conceive of sin as a turning in on oneself 
(in Luther’s terms: incurvatus in se) in a manner that cuts us off from the neighbour, where 
a central cause for this in-turning is wanting to take credit for our goodness in a way that 
fuels our pride, setting ourselves above one another while equally treating our lives as 
something we can control ourselves apart from others14 – where in a theological context, 
seeing ourselves as not needing God is central to the vice of superbia. For Løgstrup, taking 
credit for our own goodness also then means that when we are called upon to care for 
others, we think we are entitled to judge them,15 and also demand something from them in 
return,16 which again puts them in a situation of indebtedness to us and hence in a position 
of some inferiority, rather than the kind of equality that love for the neighbour requires. 
 However, while the issues here are broadly parallel in Kierkegaard and Løgstrup, I 
think their response is interestingly different, in a way that I want to highlight here. For 
Kierkegaard, as we have seen, ‘infinite humiliation and grace’ is key to overcoming the pride 
that gets in the way of love, by inducing humility instead through the convicting use of the 
law and the divine forgiveness that is then required, for which we owe an infinite debt of 
gratitude to God. For Løgstrup, by contrast, it is not through the understanding of grace as 
divine forgiveness that counteracts pride, but the understanding that ‘life is a gift’ – where 
this view is summarised in a key sentence at the end of Chapter 7 of The Ethical Demand: 
‘For from the receiving of our own life – if we really do live in receipt of it – spring the works 
                                                        
natural love were not given to human beings, but were a human being’s own achievements and belonged to 
the account of the self. 
But there is nothing to subtract from human wickedness. The self brings everything under the power 
of its selfishness. The human will is bound in this. The demand to love, that as a demand is addressed to our 
will, is unfulfillable’ (K. E. Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand (trans. Bjørn Rabjerg and Robert Stern, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2020), p. 121). 
13 Bjørn Rabjerg has suggested to me that this may be because Løgstrup wanted to avoid the theological 
associations with these terms – so that instead he uses his own terminology, when he talks about our will to 
be sovereign over our own lives: see for example The Ethical Demand, p. 100, p. 114, p. 117, p. 126, p. 135, p. 
148. 
14 ‘We say that human beings are unfree in the way they conduct themselves. That is to say that a human 
being is imprisoned within themselves. – Human beings are their own prisoner; this is the hopelessness of 
existence, because it means that we are incapable of freeing ourselves – any attempt to do so will only 
imprison us even further in ourselves. Cf. Luther’s struggle with monasticism. Because we ourselves can do 
nothing but imprison ourselves more and more in bondage and reflection and self-absorption, in short: in 
pride’ (K. E. Løgstrup, Notebook XXV.3.1, p. 34 [1938-89?]). 
15 Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, p. 99: Who says that the life of the other human being is worth more than my 
life? Why should every judgment of them in terms of culture, character, and morality be ruled out?’ 
16 Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, p. 99: ‘We justify our protest [against the ethical demand] by introducing the 
viewpoint of reciprocity. This viewpoint must be used to regulate our lives together and for moderating the 
demand, so that the person who is placed under it also receives their due’. 
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of love’.17 In speaking here of ‘works of love’, Løgstrup presumably intends his reader to 
think of Kierkegaard’s own seminal text on this issue – but whereas Kierkegaard spoke of 
‘infinite humiliation and grace’ as making these works possible, Løgstrup talks of ‘the 
receiving of our own life’ as what is required instead. Thus, while as a Lutheran, Løgstrup is 
no less convinced of our wickedness than Kierkegaard, he nonetheless does not treat divine 
grace as fundamental to overcoming our pride, but puts the claim that life is given to us in 
its place, which then gives gratitude and indebtedness a different role.18 
 What Løgstrup means by talking of life as a gift and as something received is a 
complex matter, which cannot be gone into fully here.19 But the two key ideas are that life 
as such is good and enables us to do the good (as otherwise it would not be a gift, but a 
curse), and that we are less responsible for our goodness than we like to think; rather, this 
goodness is something we are given and do not bring about through our own efforts.20 It is 
this second idea that is then required as an antidote for pride, as we consequently cannot 
claim credit for this goodness as our achievement in ways that might set us above others, 
while also making us indebted for that goodness in a way that should induce the humility 
needed for love – both in the case of natural love involving partners, family and friends, and 
in the case of neighbour love, as Løgstrup argues in the passage referred to above.21 In 
                                                        
17 Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, p. 123. For comment on the qualification (‘if we really do live in receipt of it’), 
see note 21 below. 
18 Cf. Opgør med Kierkegaard (Aarhus: Klim, 2013), p. 78, where Løgstrup argues against Kierkegaard that 
thankfulness can replace resignation in preventing what we love being turned into an idol. 
19 For further discussion see Robert Stern, The Radical Demand in Løgstrup’s Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2019), especially Chapter 3 and §12.2. 
20 One thing Løgstrup obviously does not mean by calling life a gift is that one can do as one likes with what is 
given. In a response to a critic on this issue, Løgstrup argues that even most ordinary gifts are not like that, 
where ‘one most certainly does owe the person the consideration of treating the gift as a gift – say, not 
packing it away if its function is, in fact, to stand, hang, or lie in full view’ (Løgstrup, Beyond the Ethical Demand 
(trans. Susan Drew and Heidi Flegal, ed. Kees van Kooten Niekerk, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 
2007), p. 46). But more significantly, as we will see, because life is not really to be thought of as personified, 
one cannot say of what it gives us that it does so in order to let us do what we like with it, as one might do in 
the human case. 
21 Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, pp. 122–3: ‘Just as it is obvious that our lives are understood as given to us 
when in natural love the other is a vital part of our lives, so the same understanding that our life is received 
should be just as obvious when the life of another human being depends on us, no matter how alien or hostile 
they may be to us. For from the receiving of our own life—if we really do live in receipt of it—spring the works 
of love.’ I take Løgstrup qualification ‘if we really do live in receipt of it’ to signal partly that we can easily 
deceive ourselves about such things, and partly that seeing life as a gift is no merely theoretical attitude, but a 
way in which one lives one’s life; cf. pp. 100–1: ‘In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should be added 
that an individual may very well dispute theoretically that their life has been given to them, while yet still in 
fact taking it as a gift. Likewise, an individual may theorize in a grand fashion that they have received their life, 
while in fact taking it as if nothing is a gift, but that everything is theirs by right’. 
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natural love, the love we feel for the beloved is not something we can create or control, but 
is given to use through the relationship to the beloved, and if we thought otherwise the love 
would be destroyed; likewise, in neighbour love, we do not bring about this love for 
ourselves either, and if we thought we did, it would fuel exactly the kind of self-righteous 
pride that would take it away.22 So just as when we respond to a beloved with love, this love 
is given to us, equally when we respond to a dependent being with love, this love is given to 
us, ‘so the same understanding that our life is received should be just as obvious’ in both 
cases. Furthermore, because we cannot claim credit for this response, the demand on us 
from others must remain one-sided, in the sense that we cannot require any ‘payback’ in 
return for that love, as it is not down to us in the first place, but something given. 
 Thus, while both Kierkegaard and Løgstrup see that pride undermines love, and that 
humility is required instead, for the former this has its source in an account of grace given to 
us by God, and in the other in the claim that life is properly seen as a gift.23 Having 
highlighted this difference, I now want to consider whether Løgstrup’s more secular 
alternative can be made to work. 
  
2. Divine grace or life as a gift? 
In considering how far Løgstrup’s approach can claim to be a successful alternative to 
Kierkegaard’s, I am going to focus on four issues. First, it might be said that one advantage 
of Løgstrup’s approach is that it is less committed than Kierkegaard’s to theological 
considerations in making the case for humility – but is this really so? While it can be argued 
that Løgstrup intended his approach here to be secular (though even that can be 
                                                        
22 Cf. Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, p. 120: ‘For this reason, trust and love also contain within them the 
understanding that our life and the human being who is the object of our love have been given to us. They 
cannot be separated from that understanding, however unconscious it may be. They are distorted when I 
make them “mine”, regarding them as my own achievement… [L]ove is stifled when it is turned into a matter 
of my own meritoriousness’. 
23 I should stress here that in comparing Kierkegaard and Løgstrup, I am focusing just on how far Løgstrup can 
claim to match Kierkegaard in offering a secularised account of how pride (and anxiety) are to be removed as 
blockages to love, and thus can provide us with a secular way of understanding the Lutheran thought that 
certain obstacles need overcoming if it is to be possible for us to love the neighbour. It is a further question, 
but beyond the scope of this paper, whether a religious or a secular account can best account for neighbour 
love as an attitude as such, and whether this needs God as a middle term (as on Kierkegaard’s account), or just 
the awareness of the vulnerability of the other which is fundamental to the structure of life (as on Løgstrup’s 
account).  
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disputed),24 it can be questioned whether this intention can be realised, which would put 
both accounts on a par in this respect. Second, we will consider whether Løgstrup’s account 
is caught in a dilemma of either allowing us some achievements on which to base our pride, 
or being implausibly radical in denying us any hand in our doings at all. Third, we will discuss 
how far each option deals successfully with an issue that faces all positions in this tradition: 
namely, in taking away pride, does this approach encourage instead a damaging sort of self-
contempt that is also problematic in its own way. Finally, we will examine whether 
Kierkegaard’s approach does better than Løgstrup’s in dealing with another key threat to 
neighbour love, which is anxiety and the self-concern it generates. 
 
2.1 Theological vs ‘purely human’ arguments for humility 
While himself a person of clear religious faith, and while he reflects very interestingly on the 
relation between ethics and theological themes, nonetheless in presenting his central 
ethical position in The Ethical Demand, Løgstrup purports to be working from a ‘purely 
human’ standpoint,25 which seems to license understanding his position in secular terms. To 
many readers, this in turn may seem to give his approach to the issues under discussion 
here an advantage over Kierkegaard’s, as of course the latter’s position is clearly and 
emphatically religious, and thus has extra commitments that Løgstrup’s approach would 
seem to avoid. As such, it may seem to offer a different way to understand the grounds for 
humility which can be adopted by those who wish to drop Kierkegaard’s more religious 
perspective. 
However, the question then arises whether Løgstrup approach really can be as secular 
as it professes, and whether any secular understanding of that approach has the resources 
to achieve what is required here – or whether it is only in a religious framework that 
thinking of ‘life as a gift’ can take away pride in a satisfactory manner. 
The problem here can be pressed as follows: In talking about ‘life as a gift’ in a way that 
implies we are thereby indebted, this only makes sense if there is a giver of the gift to whom 
                                                        
24 For further discussion with references to the debate, see Stern, The Radical Demand in Løgstrup’s Ethics, 
especially Chapter 3. It should be noted that Løgstrup himself presents his project to operate in ‘purely human 
terms’ in The Ethical Demand as an ‘attempt’ or trial (forsøge) or ‘task’ (opgave) (see e.g. the title of §1 of the 
Introduction; p. 5 note 1; and p. 93), which arguably turns out to have some limits that are arrived at in 
Chapter 12 – but for the purposes of this paper, I too am going to attempt to make his conception work in 
secular terms. 
25 Cf. Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, Introduction, §1. 
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we are indebted, and in the context in which we are using such notions, the only available 
gift-giver is God. There is thus no way to make this strategy work, in could be argued, 
without doing so in a religious way, and attributing our accomplishments not just to ‘life’ 
but to God as the creator and sustainer of that life. Thus, it could be claimed that in the end 
for his approach to work, Løgstrup’s position is no more secular than Kierkegaard’s, and any 
putative advantage it might have on this score is therefore quickly lost.  
In response, it can be granted that it may be generally be easier or more common for 
the religious person to view ‘life as a gift’, where typically perhaps ‘[w]hether they excel 
technically or morally, people with strong religious conviction attribute their ability and 
accomplishments to God’s gifts or to His presence in their lives’, as Joseph Kupfer has 
observed.26 However, the issue is whether this is the only way to come to something akin to 
this ‘understanding of life’. To challenge this claim, the secular account must do three 
things: (i) explain the goodness of what it is that life gives us, as otherwise this would not be 
a gift but a curse; (ii) explain what makes this something given by life, rather than brought 
about through our own efforts; (iii) explain how talk of indebtedness and givenness can 
make sense in this picture, without hypostasizing life as a giver in a quasi-religious manner. 
Let me say something about each in turn. 
(i) While Løgstrup fully recognises that we might ‘protest’ against the idea that life is a 
gift due to the many bad things we find in life, such as ‘suffering and death’,27 he still thinks 
life clearly comprises forms of goodness which this very protest presupposes  – where he 
includes here ‘understanding, speech, experience, love’28 and also what he later calls ‘the 
sovereign expressions of life’, such as trust, love, and hope.29 In all these cases, Løgstrup 
argues, life provides a framework (as it were) that makes our life possible and enables it to 
flourish, by providing us with fundamental goods without which we could not function 
                                                        
26 Joseph Kupfer, ‘The Moral Perspective of Humility’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003), pp. 249–69, p. 
260. 
27 Cf. Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, §6.4. 
28 Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, p. 100. 
29 Løgstrup first uses this terminology in ‘Sartres og Kierkegaards skildring af den dæmoniske indesluttethed’ 
[Sartre’s and Kierkegaard’s Portrayal of Demonic Self-Enclosedness], Vindrosen, 13 (1966), pp. 28–42, which is 
then incorporated into Controverting Kierkegaard (1968) Part III, §IV, which is translated into English in 
Løgstrup, Beyond the Ethical Demand. Løgstrup never gives a definitive list of these sovereign expressions of 
life, but see Beyond the Ethical Demand, p. 70, where Løgstrup identifies sincerity, compassion, and fidelity, 
and p. 71, where he lists trust, compassion, and openness of speech, while trust and compassion are also 
mentioned on p. 52. Love is mentioned at p. 128, and hope at p. 125. 
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properly at all – as is evident when for some reason they are taken away, and we suffer as a 
result, so that what is bad is really life taking a deficient form. Also (and relatedly) by 
providing us with this framework, it enables us to do the good, which would be impossible 
without trust, love and hope – which (as a convinced Lutheran) are taken by Løgstrup to be 
things we cannot generate or cultivate for ourselves as virtues. 
(ii) Løgstrup would appear to have two main arguments why these goods must be 
something given to us, rather that arising from our own efforts. The first is that left to 
ourselves, we are wicked, and so incapable of bringing about the good. Thus, at the end of 
§7.6 of The Ethical Demand, where Løgstrup is emphasising that wickedness, he argues that 
goods like trust and love cannot be credited to us precisely because this wickedness means 
that such goods cannot be ‘a human being’s own achievements and [belong] to the account 
of the self’, because ‘there is nothing to subtract from human wickedness’: ‘The self brings 
everything under the power of its selfishness’ (p. 121). To put this in a familiar Lutheran 
metaphor, left to ourselves we are like the bad tree that can only bring forth bad fruit – so 
we cannot claim credit for what good there is in the world. The second argument is less 
reliant on these normative claims about human wickedness, but could instead be put in a 
more transcendental form: namely, our lives depend on certain prior structures like trust 
and love in order to make them possible at all, and so they cannot be brought into being by 
our own efforts, as we rely on them to exist and function in the first place. For example, 
Løgstrup suggests that ‘it is integral to being human’ that we are able to trust others, 
arguing that ‘[w]e simply could not live, our life would wither away and become stunted, if 
we were in advance to meet each other in distrust’ (p. 9). Insofar as there is a 
transcendental aspect to this claim,30 and the ability to trust others is being treated as a 
condition of our existence, then it can be argued that this is not something we have brought 
about, but in fact have to rely on in order to function at all. However, this transcendental 
claim does not require grounding in a theological account in order to explain where these 
conditions for life come from instead.31 Having established that trust and the other 
                                                        
30 For further discussion, see Robert Stern, ‘“Trust is Basic’: Løgstrup on the Priority of Trust’, in Paul Faulkner 
and Thomas Simpson (eds.), The Philosophy of Trust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 272–94, 
especially pp. 278–83. 
31 In the spirit of Løgstrup’s ‘attempt’ mentioned earlier, he does nonetheless allow that the way in which life 
provides us with these goods may ‘suggest a religious interpretation’: but again, I think it is significant that he 
says that it does not require it. See Løgstrup, Beyond the Ethical Demand, p. 139; and for further discussion see 
Stern, The Radical Demand in Løgstrup’s Ethics, pp. 195–7. 
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sovereign expressions of life are good and hence gifts in this sense, these arguments thus 
enable Løgstrup to claim that they are goods that we do not create for ourselves, but are 
received, thereby also covering this aspect of being a gift but without needing to bring in a 
divine gift-giver. If successful, this would seem to be sufficient to establish that one cannot 
claim credit here, and thus to dismantle any pride that might arise on this basis. 
(iii) Finally, however, another aspect of the argument against pride may seem harder to 
substantiate in a secular manner: namely, that this gift giving means that we owe a debt of 
gratitude – for how is this possible unless the gift comes from an agent to whom we are 
grateful, and thus to whom we owe the debt? In response to this worry, several points can 
be made. First, I think it is possible to argue that gratitude as a general form of thankfulness 
is an attitude we can perfectly well show to what brings us some good, where what brings 
us that good can be entirely impersonal: for example, I can be thankful for the oxygen in this 
room because it enables me to breathe, or for the ladder because it stops me falling, or for 
the nice weather that means I can have a picnic, where in none of these cases do I think 
there is any person to whom I feel gratitude.32 Secondly, I think it is significant that while 
Løgstrup speaks of indebtedness (see ED, p. 100), he claims this is an indebtedness we stand 
in towards the person who needs care, rather than to some gift-giver, where I would argue 
here Løgstrup is using the term ‘debtor’ (skyldner) in the general sense of ‘owing something 
to another’ (where ‘skylde’ is ‘to owe’). Løgstrup’s central claim, therefore, is not that we 
are indebted because of what someone has done for us, but rather that because we are 
under some obligation to care for others in need, we are indebted to them in that sense – 
this care is what we owe to the other.33 Løgstrup then uses his claim about life being a gift 
to block the suggestion that in fact we do not stand under this debt to others because our 
capacity for self-creation makes us ‘sovereign over our own lives’ and hence do not owe 
anything to anyone. There is thus a way to understand Løgstrup’s talk of indebtedness here 
which again avoids any theological commitments of the sort that Kierkegaard builds into his 
                                                        
32 It is relevant to note that the Danish term ‘taknemlighed’ can be used for both gratitude towards 
someone, and for thankfulness in this more general sense. 
33 In his essay ‘Ethics and Ontology’ (which was published in German), Løgstrup also uses indebtedness 
(Schuldigkeit) in this sense: ‘…the right to demand something of us arises from the fact that we owe something 
[daß wir etwas shuldig sind]. It is from this aspect that the demands acquire their content. Just as one speaks 
of demands in purely economic contexts: Due to our debts [Shuldern], one places demands on us… [T]o obey a 
demand means following it with the knowledge of one’s own indebtedness [Schuldigkeit]’ (‘Ethics and 
Ontology’, trans. Eric Walkins as appendix to The Ethical Demand (trans. Theodor I. Jensen and Gary Puckering, 
edited Hans Fink and Alasdair MacIntyre, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1997), p. 291. 
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picture in order to overcome pride. Of course, this does then mean that as there is no 
indebtedness to a person for our abilities on Løgstrup’s account as I am understanding it, 
this kind of indebtedness cannot be used to strike down our pride in those abilities – but 
then, as we have seen, Løgstrup account of ‘life as a gift’ arguably offers enough other 
grounds on which to do that. 
 
2.2. The givenness of divine grace vs the givenness of abilities 
However, this may now seem to lead us directly into the second issue I wish to discuss, on 
which the theological conception offered by Kierkegaard may seem required rather than 
Løgstrup’s more secular approach. As we have seen, for Kierkegaard what is given and what 
we are to feel grateful for is God’s gracious forgiveness of us in the face of our wickedness, 
for which we all stand equally condemned in a way that undercuts any superiority we may 
feel, where it is only through God’s grace that we are able to do the good. By contrast, on 
Løgstrup’s account, we are to have our pride taken away by realising that the capacities for 
which we claim credit are not in fact our own doing but are received or given to us. Now, a 
response to both accounts may be to say that they are exaggerated: against Kierkegaard it 
can be said that we are capable of some good works in which we can take justified pride, 
and against Løgstrup it can be claimed that we have some capacities which we have 
developed for ourselves, and for which we deserve credit. On Kierkegaard’s behalf, 
however, there is a standard Lutheran response which while challengeable, is at least pretty 
familiar: namely, where good works occur, they only occur as a result of the process of 
grace Kierkegaard has identified and for the reasons he gives. But Løgstrup may appear to 
face a trickier challenge: for it may seem undeniable that we are capable of fostering our 
capacities for ourselves at least to some extent, and to deny this would be to take away our 
agency to an implausible degree. The dilemma for Løgstrup would thus seem to be: if he 
treats all our capacities as given, then this becomes implausible, but if he treats some as 
developed by the self, won’t they then become a source of pride? Going back to my 
example, if I can think that it is through my hard work at school, or through developing my 
abilities and thereby getting a good job, that I am now in a better position than the beggar 
who needs my help, why doesn’t this give me a justified sense of superiority over him? But if 
in response Løgstrup says that all these abilities are also given to me, doesn’t that deprive 
me of my agency to an extreme degree? 
 13 
 Now, it might be possible for Løgstrup to bite the bullet here, and make a case for 
the extreme position – perhaps by arguing that in the end, it is all a matter of good fortune 
what abilities we have, what temperament, what opportunities. But another option is for 
him to make his case without needing to go this far; and that this is his view is perhaps 
suggested by a comment he makes in this context, where he seems to allow that a person 
may ‘possess…their success, their endowments, their advantages’ – but to argue that this 
does not undermine his case. For, he also argues, life has still ‘lavished on them’ much else, 
and that this is sufficient to do what is required to show that ‘life is a gift’ – that ‘the 
individual to whom the demand is addressed has nothing in their existence that was not 
given to them’.34 On this reading, Løgstrup here is not claiming that there is nothing 
whatsoever that the individual possesses that was not given to them – for he has allowed 
that they possess ‘their success, their endowments, their advantages’; rather, he is claiming 
that when it comes to what they are ethically asked to do, they cannot respond to this 
demand without relying on what was given to them, and so can claim no credit for making 
this response. 
 What difference does this make? I think it might enable Løgstrup to use the 
goodness of the demand in a structurally analogous way that Kierkegaard uses God – 
namely, a measure of goodness which we cannot attain, thereby ‘putting us in the wrong’35 
in a way that nullifies all other possible measures of superiority as sources of pride. On this 
account, Løgstrup does not have to deny that I have achieved various things that perhaps 
the person I am helping has not – but seen from the perspective of ‘life as a gift’, given that I 
cannot act ethically towards another based on these achievements but only by relying on 
what I have not achieved for myself, this measure of esteem disappears, while also avoiding 
the problematic dilemma outlined above. For, no matter what achievements I might claim 
to possess, it turns out that to follow the demand, the individual must depend on what is 
given to them to make this possible, and so cannot claim any credit for doing so – and this is 
the only basis on which ultimately to feel superior to another, as a moral being, no matter 
what else one may have achieved elsewhere. 
                                                        
34 Løgstrup, The Ethical Demand, p. 100. 
35 Cf. ‘Ultimatum’ of Either/Or: ‘The Upbuilding That Lies in the Thought That in Relation to God We Are Always 
in the Wrong’, in Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Part II (trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press), pp. 339–54. 
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2.3 Pride vs self-esteem 
However, this again may seem to lead directly to a third worry that applies to both 
Kierkegaard’s position and Løgstrup’s, but which former may be able to handle better than 
the latter. This worry concerns doubts one might have about their focus on humility, which 
is that this focus can be damaging to individuals insofar as each of us needs a level of 
healthy self-esteem and self-love, to avoid feeling crushed and humiliated. Again, while this 
is a worry that has been directed at Luther and Kierkegaard,36 they might seem in a better 
position to handle it than Løgstrup, as while the ‘theology of the cross’ undoubtedly 
involves some element of having one’s self-esteem taken away, arguably a ‘proper self-love’ 
can be restored through the process of then coming to recognise one’s reliance on a loving 
and forgiving God – so while pride is removed, the individual is not left with a sense of 
debilitating humility, but a humility that is also ‘upbuilding’ and allows the agent to retain 
their self-respect as a result of their relation to God. Can Løgstrup’s more secular approach 
achieve anything similar and so offer its own response to this concern? 
 In the great emphasis Løgstrup puts on our wickedness, it may seem that he just 
intends to leave us with this as our primary sense of self, and that this must remain our 
focus if our pride is to be taken away – and to view oneself as irredeemably wicked may 
indeed seem to threaten all sense of worth in oneself. However, it can be argued that even 
on Løgstrup’s account, while this emphasis on our wickedness is given a crucial role in 
getting us to see we that cannot claim credit for the good we do and thus use this to offset 
our wrongs, Løgstrup is not claiming that we lack goodness altogether – it is just that this 
goodness cannot be realised through our own efforts. Thus, while he admitted he was not 
entirely clear on this in The Ethical Demand,37 he later allowed that we can indeed love, 
trust, hope, and so on, in ways that exemplify goodness – it is just that this goodness is 
given to us, rather than something we bring about for ourselves. Nonetheless, it is arguable 
that this is enough to form the basis for a certain kind of self-respect, but one which leaves 
no room for pride: insofar as I am capable of loving the neighbour, I exemplify goodness and 
can value myself on this basis, but this is not a value on which I can build a sense of pride in 
                                                        
36 For a study of this issue in relation to Kierkegaard, see John Lippitt, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Self-Love 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
37 For further discussion of this issue, see Stern, The Radical Demand in Løgstrup’s Ethics, p. 90. 
 15 
my achievements, because this love for the neighbour is precisely not my achievement, and 
thus must be viewed with humility – but not a humility that robs me of all self-respect. Thus, 
while on Løgstrup’s account this self-respect is not restored to us through knowing we are 
forgiven by a loving God, it is arguably restored to us in a different way, by seeing that while 
we are capable of great wickedness in a way that breaks with the goodness of life, we are 
also ourselves living beings who still partake in that goodness, a goodness that forms the 
basis for a ‘proper self-love’ in which there is no element of pride. Once again, therefore, it 
would seem that Løgstrup’s secular approach can find a way to answer the challenge we 
have been discussing by using resources that are different from Kierkegaard’s. 
 
2.4 Pride vs anxiety 
Finally, I would like to turn to another issue on which the theological account offered by 
Kierkegaard may seem to have an advantage over Løgstrup’s more secular approach. Here 
the objection is: even if what I have said above is enough to defend that secular approach, it 
is still problematic in being directed at only one potential barrier to neighbour love, namely 
pride – but there are other potential barriers, particularly various forms of anxiety and 
worry,38 which are equally significant and which Løgstrup’s account does nothing to address, 
making his account incomplete when compared to Kierkegaard’s, who has more resources 
at his disposal because he takes a theological approach. 
 The issue here may be illustrated by returning to the example with which I began, 
where my relation to the beggar can be distorted from one of love not only by my 
condescending attitude to him fuelled by pride, but also by a failure of attention to him at 
all, fuelled by a focus on myself that is driven by a kind of anxious self-concern, as I dwell on 
what faces me today and what it is that I need to achieve, leading me to turn in on myself 
and away from him. Equally, I might use helping the other as a way to bolster my faltering 
sense of self, rather than caring for him for his own sake. More dramatically and fatefully, 
Luther’s recounting of his so-called ‘tower experience’ may be taken as an account of how 
his anxiety over his own sinfulness cut him off from others and the world around him: to 
come to love the neighbour, this anxiety has to be dispelled. Iris Murdoch puts these issues 
                                                        
38 In his work, Kierkegaard talks of both anxiety (angst) and worry or cares (bekymring), and while he does not 
explicitly draw a systematic distinction between them, the latter seems more associated with social status 
than the former: see e.g. Christian Discourses, Part I.  
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well when she writes: ‘By opening our eyes we do not necessarily see what confronts us. We 
are anxiety-ridden animals. Our minds are continually active, fabricating an anxious, usually 
self-preoccupied, often falsifying veil which partially conceals the world’.39 The question is, 
therefore, whether the difficulties we face here can only be resolved within a religious 
framework, or whether a secular position is equally able to respond to this challenge.  
 At first sight, there might seem an easy response for the secularist to make: namely, 
that it is precisely by moving to a more secular position that some of these fundamental 
anxieties can be overcome, as they are in fact fuelled by a religious outlook, so that far from 
solving the problem it is in fact this outlook that causes them in the first place – so it is best 
just to drop that outlook, and move to the secular approach. For, it can be argued, as the 
case of Luther makes particularly vivid, a significant source of anxiety within the religious 
tradition is anxiety regarding one’s relation to God, and whether the believer has forfeited 
his love and forgiveness. It is arguable that the ‘reformation breakthrough’ which moves 
from justification through works to justification through grace is precisely designed to 
overcome this anxiety, and thereby free us from the ‘inturnedness’ that results to then 
enable us to love the neighbour.40 However, even if this shift from works to grace is 
successful in dealing with this anxiety, it could be argued by the secularist that this anxiety 
only arises in the first place due to a concern with our God-relation – so if we just drop this 
relation by moving to a secular perspective, the problem goes away of its own accord, giving 
the secular approach a clear advantage. Of course, if the God-relation was needed in order 
to strike down pride, then there might be a reason to retain it for that reason, and then face 
the problem of anxiety that results – but as argued above, it would appear that Løgstrup’s 
secular account of ‘life as a gift’ is sufficient to deal with the problem of pride, so this 
argument would not seem to be enough to motivate the need to retain the theological 
approach. 
                                                        
39 Murdoch, ‘The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts’, in Existentialism and Mystics, pp. 363–85, p. 369. 
Cf. also: ‘Most of the time we fail to see the big wide real world at all because we are blinded by obsession, 
anxiety, envy, resentment, fear. We make a small personal world in which we remain enclosed’ (Murdoch, 
‘Literature and Philosophy: A Conversation with Brian Magee’, in Existentialism and Mystics, pp. 3–30, p. 14). 
40 For Luther’s recounting of his ‘tower experience’ and the ‘breakthrough’ that is associated with it, see 
Luther’s Works, vol. 34, pp. 336–7. This issue is of course widely discussed in the literature; for a helpful 
treatment see Daphne Hampson, Christian Contradictions: The Structures of Lutheran and Catholic Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Chapter 1. 
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 However, whilst it may be tempting, there is something rather superficial about this 
secularist response: for, although it seems plausible that anxiety can indeed be fuelled by a 
problematic sense of our relation to the divine, it can also be argued that anxiety is a more 
fundamental part of the human condition, which cannot simply be shaken off by dropping 
any concern with God – rather, that anxiety is what the concern with God is aimed to 
address, where the question remains how this is to be achieved on a more secular 
approach. For Luther and Kierkegaard it is possible to put a kind of trust in God, a find a kind 
of acceptance in God, to feel a kind of joy in the relation to God, that are sufficient to dispel 
the anxieties that we face, and so can make love of the neighbour possible. Can the secular 
approach offer any alternative account? 
When it comes to Løgstrup, it could be said, no such alternative need be found, as 
while his account of ‘life as a gift’ is apparently intended to be secular (in the way we have 
understood it above), in the last main chapter of The Ethical Demand, Løgstrup himself turns 
to a discussion of God’s forgiveness as proclaimed by Jesus – so this could be read as 
Løgstrup’s own attempt to answer this question of anxiety in theological rather than secular 
terms. However, I think this would be a mistake, for while Løgstrup does make a transition 
in this chapter from a secular to a theological approach, this is not motivated by a need to 
deal with the issues of anxiety that we have been raising, but rather in order to make sense 
of the apparent unfulfillability of the ethical demand, which Løgstrup thinks requires us to 
accept a role for divine judgement in condemning us for this unfulfillability. Løgstrup makes 
this move as it allows him to block the inference that because ‘ought implies can’, as we 
cannot fulfil the demand,41 it does not apply to us. For, given the fact that God can still 
judge us for this failure, we must accept that this unfulfillability is our fault, and then that 
we still ought to fulfil it even if we cannot; and because of our own sinfulness, only a divine 
being is in a position to judge us here, and hence forgive us in the manner that Jesus 
proclaims. Thus, in addition to his framework of life as a gift, Løgstrup himself introduces a 
God-relation in his ethics at this culminating point of The Ethical Demand: but he does not 
do so to deal with the issues of anxiety that concern us here but instead to explain how we 
can stand under an unfulfillable demand. Thus I think we cannot take it that (in the manner 
                                                        
41 Løgstrup takes the demand to be unfulfillable because insofar as we experience it as a demand, we have 
already failed to love the neighbour. For further discussion, see Stern, The Radical Demand in Løgstrup’s 
Ethics, §5.1. 
 18 
of Luther and Kierkegaard) he would use this God-relation to explain how as ‘anxiety-ridden’ 
animals we can be freed from ourselves. So what account can he provide instead? In closing, 
I will suggest three ways this question might be answered. 
Firstly, as Luther and Kierkegaard also allow, one important source of this anxiety is 
what might be called ‘status anxiety’, and which relates closely to the issues of pride we 
discussed earlier. That is, we are concerned about how our achievements give us standing in 
relation to others, and seek to preserve that standing through pursuing those achievements. 
One way in which this sort of anxiety can be taken away, therefore, is when we no longer 
take any credit for those achievements, and see that others cannot do so either: we then 
lose the currency on which status depends, and thus the anxiety which goes with it. 
Moreover, insofar as our fragile sense of self is bound up with these concerns, this fragility 
can be overcome accordingly once these concerns seem less relevant. The theological 
account also deals with this kind of anxiety by attributing our merits to God; but it would 
seem Løgstrup’s account can achieve something similar by attributing them instead to life, 
as we have discussed. 
Secondly, a different kind of anxiety can arise from our sense of dependence and 
consequent vulnerability, where here the comforting sense that ‘the Lord will provide’ gives 
the theological position one clear way to respond to this worry, and hence block the kind of 
self-concerned ‘busyness’ that may otherwise be our reaction – like the worried wood-dove 
in Kierkegaard’s The Lilies and the Birds, who is induced by the tame dove to become 
concerned about its material security, and so gets busy trying to accumulate food for the 
future.42 And, at first sight it may appear that Løgstrup’s position can only make this kind of 
anxiety even worse, as of course his position places considerable emphasis on this 
dependence, which he thinks we are precisely in danger of forgetting as the anxiety it 
induces leads us to seek to hide it from ourselves. It may also seem that Løgstrup’s only way 
to address it is to appeal to a kind of trust in the ultimate goodness of life that is really only 
a form of quasi-theological optimism concerning creation which does not make much sense 
unless it is ultimately underwritten by appeal to God. 
                                                        
42 Cf. Søren Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 174–7. 
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Now, of course, the theological position has resources here that leaves the secular 
account at some disadvantage. Nonetheless, Løgstrup can perhaps claim that this anxiety is 
driven in part by an unrealistic dream of autonomy and self-sufficiency which we must 
simply learn to renounce – and once we have, we will cease to yearn for what we cannot 
attain, and accept our dependence for what it is, learning to live with it rather than fly from 
it in search of some fantasy. Moreover, once we acknowledge how much we have been 
dependent in the past rather than delude ourselves about our autonomy, we may learn to 
be less anxious about that dependence for it has sustained us thus far. Here, the humility 
we learn by seeing life as a gift may also lessen our anxiety, as we become more willing to 
accept what we cannot change or control, while also recognising a goodness in the 
structures of life that entitle us to feel some confidence in them. 
Thirdly and finally, I think it can be argued that Løgstrup’s conception of life as a gift 
leads him to re-think the conceptual structure of the problem of anxiety: for he holds that 
one thing that life gives us is precisely freedom from this anxiety by turning us away from 
ourselves through the encounter with others and the world around us – as he puts in one of 
his early writings: ‘A human being can only escape his self-preoccupation by means of a 
fellow human being’.43 On the theological account, the process is a two-stage one: first the 
God-relation frees us from our anxiety, and then we come to love the neighbour by seeing 
them properly for the first time. However, on Løgstrup’s account, it is precisely through love 
of the neighbour that we are freed from our anxiety, as in Murdoch’s famous example of 
the kestrel: 
I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, oblivious of 
my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my prestige. Then 
suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. In a moment everything is altered. The 
brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is nothing now but kestrel. 
And when I return to thinking of the other matter it seems less important.44 
Likewise, Løgstrup suggests that be freed from the forms of self-imprisonment we have 
been discussing – pride, and also anxiety – though the experience of other people and their 
needs, and this itself is not the least of the goods that life gives to us. Given this account of 
                                                        
43 K. E. Løgstrup, ‘Pligt eller anvar’, Kirken og Tiden, 14 (1938), pp. 206–17, p. 213. 
44 Murdoch, ‘The Sovereignty of Good’, p. 369. 
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Løgstrup’s position, it can therefore be argued that in his conception of ‘life’, and more 
particularly in his conception of our encounter with the other individual, we find a secular 
analogue of grace: namely, something that serves the same function of drawing us away 
from ourselves through a process that we cannot control and for which we can claim no 






                                                        
45 For further discussion of the issues raised here, including some potential difficulties with Løgstrup’s position, 
see Bjørn Rabjerg and Robert Stern, ‘Freedom from the Self: Luther and Løgstrup on Sin as “Incurvatus in Se”’, 
Open Theology, 4 (2018), pp. 268–80. 
46 I am grateful to Dan Watts for his very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
